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A Psychosocial Understanding of Personality Disorder: the historical problem of 
Moral Insanity 
 
David W Jones 
 
 
 
Various terms such as ‘psychopath’ and ‘antisocial personality disorder’ have been used 
at different times to describe individuals who act, with no apparent remorse, with great 
callousness causing disruption and distress around them. Despite being formally 
described within medical texts for many years the status of these diagnoses remains 
highly contested both within and outside of psychiatry. It will be argued that a 
psychosocial perspective can firstly help us to understand why this and related categories 
of mental disorder have been so contentious and secondly may also point us towards 
more useful ways of understanding the phenomena.  Two points about a psychosocial 
perspective are raised in this chapter. Firstly, consistent with the premise this book there 
is the engagement with the social and cultural significance of emotion. Secondly there is  
the need to cross disciplinary fissures; not only trying to bridge the most obvious gaps 
between the psychological and the sociological, between the individual and the cultural, 
but also most notably in this case the analysis benefits from historical context.  It can be 
argued that the set of problems that are described by the varieties of ‘personality 
disorders’ (such as borderline, narcissistic and anti-social personality disorders) have, 
despite the great controversy about their status and validity, been visible in slightly 
different guises since at least the beginning of the 19th century when the term ‘moral 
insanity’ had some currency (eg, Pritchard 1835). Whilst that particular diagnosis had lost 
much of its influence by the latter half of the 19th century, the diagnosis of ‘psychopath’ 
(used to describe someone whose behaviour was profoundly antisocial) appeared in the 
early decades of the 20th century and received legislative recognition in the UK (in the 
Mental Health Acts of 1959 and 1983) and in the USA (through various ‘Sexual 
Psychopath Laws’ that appeared in different States during the 1950s). The term 
‘psychopath’ has also now largely fallen out of favour and various versions of 
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‘personality disorder’ are recognised by DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) and 
ICD (International Classification of Disease) systems of classification, and have been 
subject to considerable attention from the UK government since the late 1990s.    
 
This chapter will briefly describe the contemporary controversies that surround 
personality disorder in the UK at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It will then 
move back in time to explore the emergence of the diagnosis of ‘moral insanity’ in the 
early decades of the 19th century. In both cases the arena into which the diagnoses have 
emerged and have been debated was formed at the join of ‘psychiatry’ and the criminal 
justice system. The historical context is important because it sheds light on the processes 
that have put these diagnoses into liminal psychiatric territory. Meaning on the one hand 
they are viewed as not being legitimate forms of ‘madness’, yet on the other hand neither 
have they been completely expelled from the psychiatric domain but have continued to 
lurk on the fringes,  morphing  slightly over time, but consistently demanding attention.     
 
It will be argued that these disorders are not well apprehended either by legal discourses 
of responsibility or by contemporary psychiatric and psychological models of identity 
and agency. An historical perspective helps us understand these difficulties as products of 
particular ways of construing the relationship of individual identity and the social body. 
The questions posed by this group of people are particularly challenging for us, most 
specifically they are problematic thanks to the disciplinary schisms in the human sciences 
that have allowed such a gap to appear between psychological and social explanations of 
human phenomena. They expose deep controversies about the nature of the individual, of 
selfhood and the relationship between emotion, thought and the social world.  
 
Contemporary Controversies  
 
In 2007 the UK Government introduced the Mental Health (Amendment) Act (DOH 
2007), which represented the final admission that they had failed to produce a new 
Mental Health Act (MHA) after 8 years of effort.  This occurred despite widespread 
agreement that this legislation needed to be renewed. After all, the 1983 MHA itself was 
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largely a re-drafting of the 1959 MHA. Given the enormous shifts in health and welfare 
policies, alongside changing ideas about diagnosis and treatment within psychiatry and 
related professions; the notion that it needed to be renewed was uncontested. One of the 
main reasons for the failure to agree a new Act was the issue of ‘personality disorders’ 
and how they should be managed by the National Health Service.  
 
Government interest in personality disorder was prompted by the murder investigations 
that eventually led to the conviction of Michael Stone (Jones 2008: 61-62), who had 
previously been diagnosed as suffering from a personality disorder. In July 1996 Lin 
Russell and her two daughters had been walking home along a quite country lane in Kent 
from a school swimming gala. At some point they were tied up and attacked. Lin and her 
elder daughter were killed, whilst 9 year old Josie was left for dead. The extent of the 
injuries made it clear that this was a brutal and murderous attack and her subsequent 
survival was heralded in the press as miraculous. The occurrence of the attack in broad 
daylight in a picturesque rural area of the ‘Garden of England’ was no doubt part of the 
reason for the public attention and outrage that led to the government’s interest in the 
case. There were no moral ambiguities here. The Russells were clearly innocent victims 
and the attack appeared truly ‘monstrous’. The absence of any tangible motivation for the 
attack coupled with the lack of witnesses made the case difficult to prosecute, however. A 
year after the attack, following a national television appeal for information, Michael 
Stone emerged as a suspect.  The lack of forensic or witness evidence, or indeed 
ostensible motive, meant that Stone’s eventual conviction has been contested (the 
conviction has been quashed once, only to be re-instated at the subsequent re-trial). It 
came to light that Stone not only had a history of violence, but he was well known to 
psychiatric services having been seen as suffering from a ‘personality disorder’. The 
report1 into Stone’s care quotes from a psychiatric assessment made in January 1995 
some 18 months before the killings: 
 
                                                 
1  The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the care and treatment of Michael Stone, (2006) South East 
Coast Strategic Health Authority,  Kent County Council, Kent Probation Area. 
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A tough minded man... [who] ...at no point displayed any features of a psychotic 
illness. He had credible explanations for apparently psychotic episodes… 
[and]…denied ever hearing voices. The most striking abnormality was his 
extremely callous attitude towards victims and anger and contempt towards 
several professionals involved with him. . . .My impression is that he has 
committed major violent crimes in the past and is likely to do so in the 
future…He fulfills the criteria for anti-social personality disorder and there may 
also be a paranoid mental illness.  (p.196) 
 
The psychiatrist argued that  Stone’s detention under the MHA was ‘highly 
inappropriate’ and that ‘it does not appear appropriate to offer [Mr. Stone] a bed as firstly 
he is no longer mentally ill and secondly he is unlikely to respond to a graded 
rehabilitation package’. The fact that psychiatrists were allowed by the MHA to 
distinguish between ‘mental illness’ and the kinds of difficulties that Stone exhibited 
came to be a target of Government attention. Although personality disorder did not 
feature in the 1983 MHA, its diagnostic cousin ‘psychopathy’ did,  having found a place 
in the 1959 MHA as a distinct category of mental disorder (the other three being mental 
illness, mental deficiency, and ‘other’). Psychopathy was defined as ‘a persistent disorder 
or disability of mind (whether or not including subnormality of intelligence) which 
results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’. The inclusion of 
psychopathy was controversial (Ramon 1986), with the majority of psychiatrists being 
reluctant to recognise such problems as falling within their domain. A small but vocal 
group of psychoanalytically inclined psychiatrists notably David Henderson at the 
Tavistock Clinic had advocated for the diagnosis (Henderson 1939).   
 
The UK Government has been much exorcised by the distinction made between mental 
illness and ‘psychopathy’ so clearly evident in the treatment of Michael Stone. They 
argued that personality disorders ought to be recognised and treated by the National 
Health Service just like other disorders such as depression and schizophrenia (DOH 
2003).  They wanted a new mental health act that would not only dissolve the distinction 
that was being made between ‘psychopathy’ and ‘mental illness’  but that could also be 
used to take pre-emptive action against those who might fall within such categories and 
who might offer a threat to the public (DOH 2006). Their efforts to do this faced a 
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barrage of criticism from civil liberty groups (see as Liberty 20002, for example), mental 
health lobby groups (such as MIND3) and from within psychiatry (Buchanan and Leese 
2001).  It will be argued here that to understand why this continues to be such a 
contentious category we need to explore the history of the problem.  
 
Insanity and Crime 
 
The belief that leniency ought be shown to those people who committed offences when 
they were believed to be ‘insane’ has a long history with good evidence of provisions 
being made in English law for many centuries (Reznek 1997, Walker 1968). Certainly by 
the end of the 18th century courts in England were well used to hearing and accepting the 
plea of ‘insanity’ in murder trials (Eigen 1991, Walker 1968). The nascent psychiatric 
profession began entering the courts as witnesses in some numbers towards the end of the 
18th century for both prosecution and defence (Smith 1981). They were being asked to 
give ‘expert evidence’ about the sanity of defendants. It was around this time, and largely 
within debates about criminal responsibility that attempts to define ‘moral insanity’ were 
made. 
 
Moral Insanity 
 
A small group of clinicians during the 19th century in different countries began to concern 
themselves with people who seemed not to have totally lost their reason but could act in 
very antisocial and often aggressive ways. Working from asylums in France Pinel (1806) 
is credited with the first formal written account of ‘mania without delirium’ (‘manie sans 
delire’). This might be an intermittent or continuous state, notable for there being ‘no 
sensible change in the functions of the understanding; but perversion of the active 
faculties, marked by abstract and sanguinary fury, with a blind propensity to acts of 
violence’ (Pinel 1806: 156).  Whilst Pinel’s work was clearly located in criminological 
                                                 
2 Liberty (2000) Managing People with Severe Personality Disorder: Response to Government 
Consultation.  January. 
3 MIND (2004) Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill.  
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concerns, as witnessed by the fact that he analysed a number of notorious murder cases, 
many of the cases that the British medic Prichard described as ‘moral insanity’ are taken 
to be the first published definitions of more general personality disorders (Elliott and 
Gillet 1992:53). Prichard was describing people who seemed to have normal intellectual 
functioning (similar to Pinel’s cases, they were not suffering from delusions or disorders 
of perception) but their behaviour was clearly abnormally antisocial. In a famous and 
often quoted passage Prichard (1835) described ‘moral insanity’ in the following terms:   
 
A form of mental derangement in which the intellectual faculties appear to have 
sustained little or no injury, while the disorder is manifested principally or alone, 
in the state of the feelings, temper, or habits. . . .  [T]he moral and active 
principles of the mind are strangely perverted and depraved; the power of self 
government is lost or greatly impaired; and the individual is found to be 
incapable, not of talking or reasoning upon any subject proposed to him, for this 
he will often do with great shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself 
with decency and propriety in the business of life . . .  (Prichard A Treatise on 
Insanity 1835: 4) 
 
 
Whilst with hindsight some of the cases described by Prichard might nowadays receive 
rather different diagnoses such as ‘bipolar affective disorder’, there is little doubt that 
some of the characteristics highlighted by Prichard are consistent with some of the cases 
of psychopathy described a hundred years later who might be quite successful, but 
ruthless, in their careers, for example (Cleckley 1941; Hare 1993). Prichard’s arguments 
about ‘moral insanity’ were taking place within debates about capital punishment. 
Prichard argued that sufferers of ‘moral insanity’ who committed murder, ought to escape 
the gallows and be treated in hospital. Similarly in the United States Isaac Ray was 
directly concerned with the legal definitions of insanity in arguing that cases of ‘moral 
mania’ and ‘partial moral mania’ should be recognised. Ray argued that types of partial 
moral mania included compulsive stealing, lying, erotomania, destructiveness and also 
‘homicidal insanity’ (Ray: 1838: 264).    
 
The notion of ‘moral insanity’ began to gather critics, particularly within the medical, and 
nascent psychiatric profession. Support collected around an opposing cognitive view of 
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insanity (that is one that accepts only disturbances in the capacity of the mind to perceive 
and comprehend the world in a rational manner as being legitimate cases of insanity, 
Robinson 1999). This line of thinking found concrete expression in the legal definition of 
insanity that was enshrined by the M’Naghten rules of 1844.   
 
 
Daniel M'Naghten and the Insanity Defence 
 
Daniel M’Naghten was a Scot who came to believe that he was, thanks to his interest in 
Scottish nationalism, being persecuted by the Prime Minister Robert Peel. By early 1843, 
M’Naghten had determined to assassinate Peel. He came to believe that Peel’s secretary 
Drummond was actually the prime minister and on the 20th January 1843 he followed 
Drummond up Whitehall and shot him fatally in the back.  Had M’Naghten not attempted 
to take the life of the Prime Minister he would have, as was customary, appeared in court 
in a matter of days (and quite possibly he would have been dispatched from the gallows a 
couple of days after that). As his crime was considered to be one of treason, there was a 
delay whilst evidence was collected, witnesses were sought and the trial became a much 
grander and drawn out affair. At the trial medical testimony and evidence from those who 
had known M’Naghten before the event was sufficient to convince the jury that he should 
be found not guilty by reason of insanity. M’Naghten therefore, instead of being 
executed, was transferred to Bethlem Lunatic Asylum. Twenty years later he was moved 
to Broadmoor which was opened specifically to cater for the apparently growing numbers 
of ‘criminal lunatics’ where he died (Allderidge 1974).  Despite the fact that the 
precedence for this outcome was already well established (witnesses were describing 
M’Naghten having delusions of persecution that would very conceivably be consistent 
with a contemporary diagnosis of schizophrenia), the high profile and political impact of 
the case drew a great deal of attention to the verdict. There was public outcry, fanned 
perhaps by Queen Victoria’s alleged dismay about the apparent leniency of the outcome, 
which led to a legal review (Walker 1968). The result of this review were the so-called 
M’Naghten rules which aimed to spell out what conditions had to be met for someone to 
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be able to have their behaviour excused by reason of insanity. For the insanity defence to 
be applicable, it would have to be established that: 
 
. . . at the time of the committing of the act, the defendant was labouring 
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
what the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did not know 
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
 
 
Thus for insanity to be recognised it would have to be proven that the defendant did not 
‘know’ the difference between right and wrong. So long as an individual had a rational 
view of the world around them, undistorted by delusions, then they were sane. The notion 
that someone might not be able to control their actions, or may not comprehend their own 
or others feelings, or could have no grasp of the meaning of the distress they caused to 
others, for example, were ruled as outside of this definition of insanity.  Thus the ‘moral 
insanity’ diagnosis which supposed individuals to have a rational perception of the world, 
unimpeded by delusions was clearly excluded.  This might well have been the end of the 
story for moral insanity, but instead it has re-emerged in rather different forms over the 
past 100 or so years, firstly as psychopathy and then various forms of personality 
disorder.  
 
Considered separately each of the categories of moral insanity, psychopathy and 
personality disorder might well fit alongside Hacking’s (1998) examples of  ‘transient 
mental illnesses’ (such as ‘fugues’) which need to be understood as interesting 
phenomena that exist perhaps fleetingly in the very particular niches created at the 
vectors of various social, historical, cultural and psychological ‘forces’. It can be argued, 
however, that there are common threads between each of these three categories, and there 
is thus some longevity to this particular niche. This is interesting as these medical 
categories have survived despite little support, and indeed often great scepticism from  
medical colleagues (Arieff and Rotman 1948), the legal professions (Hakeem 1958; Hall 
Williams, Gibbens and Jennings 1960) and academia (Pilgrim 2001). It will be argued 
that we need to look beyond the discussions of professionals in order to understand the 
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persistence of these diagnoses. Through understanding the forces that have created and 
sustained these categories a better understanding of current dilemmas can be built.  
 
It is argued that three overlapping explanations for the emergence of the category of 
‘moral insanity’ can be identified. Each of these help our understanding, but the third, the 
psychosocial explanation, is necessary for providing a fuller picture. Firstly, there is the 
largely sociological notion that the diagnosis emerged from concern with social control 
within a society that was seeking out new ways to isolate and therefore control deviancy. 
Secondly, there is the idea that the dispute over the category grew from philosophical 
and, more specifically, psychological debate over the constitution of human nature. 
Whilst both theories have validity, it will be argued here that a third more psychosocial 
line of exploration is the most productive.  This raises the question of the relation of the 
individual to the social body and it is here that the benefits of a psychosocial approach 
become clear.  
 
 
i. New Forms of Social Control:  Morality and the Criminal justice System 
 
Ramon (1986) argued that the interest in ‘moral insanity’ was in keeping with the more 
general tendency to try and differentiate, and therefore segregate, forms of ‘anti-social’ 
behaviour. It is certainly the case that the 19th century witnessed the birth of psychiatry 
and the mushrooming of asylums for the insane (Jones 1972, Scull 1979) alongside the 
development of prisons (Gatrell, Lenman and Parker 1980). Rimke and Hunt (2002) also 
suggest there were parallels between 19th century moral concerns (over sexual 
promiscuity, for example) and the development of such diagnoses. Supporting this 
argument are the facts that the emergence of moral insanity was tied directly to concern 
with criminality, indeed Rafter (2004) refers to the medical interest in ‘moral insanity’ as 
representing a pre-history of criminology. In France Pinel (1806) analysed many cases 
involving serious violence as he sought to establish the diagnosis of manie sans delire. 
Eigen (1991) plots some of the arguments between lawyers and medical witnesses in 
London about insanity between 1825 and 1843 using court records.  The prominence of 
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the criminal justice system (CJS) should not make us think that the issue was simply 
confined to debates about the nature of criminality, however. It can be argued that the 
CJS itself was a crucible within which wider concerns about the nature of ‘society’ and of 
‘selfhood’ were being analysed. The CJS has been described as being in a state of 
ferment through this period (Hay 1980, Gatrell,  Lenman, and Parker 1980), witnessing 
disputes of authority between juries and judges (Wiener 1999), and between medical men 
and lawyers (Smith 1981).  In part these were perhaps battles of professional power, but 
they were also taking place within debates about the nature of individual agency. 
 
ii Shifting notions of self and personality 
 
Another framework, therefore, for understanding the emergence of ‘moral insanity’, and 
the subsequent resistance to acceptance of its existence, is that provided by philosophical 
debates about the nature of humanity. There were two related aspects to this debate. 
Firstly, there is the question of the coherence of human consciousness. Are human minds 
better understood as having a unitary coherence or are we better understood as being 
made up of a number of separate faculties? Debates over moral insanity were entangled 
with those over ‘partial insanity’ (the premise being that there might be aspects of an 
individual’s mind that were insane whilst others were not) and also ‘temporary insanity’, 
where an individual might lose their sanity in particular circumstances only. Secondly, 
there was the issue of the relation between emotion and reason. Are human beings better 
defined by their capacity to experience emotion, or their capacity for rational thought? An 
influential line of argument has taken the view that ‘the Enlightenment’ privileged 
rational thought, and that this had huge implications for perceptions and treatment of the 
insane (Foucault 1967, Hodgkin 2007). The hallmark of humanity became the ability to 
use reason to control the emotions. If an individual appeared to have reason, then it was 
assumed they could control their passions. Such a view of the nature of insanity had been 
influentially formalised by John Locke who argued that insanity was caused by mis-
associations being made in the mind between sense data and ideas (Porter 2002, for 
example).  The notion of an insanity that affected only the feelings or morals, whilst 
leaving reasoning intact, was therefore largely anathema. 
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 In contrast, was the belief (exemplified by the various ‘Romantic’ schools in art, music 
and literature) that it was human beings’ capacity to feel that raised us above other 
species.  To feel love, to act upon feelings of care, altruism, imagination, or even hatred 
were the truly important human capacities (Eichner 1982). Within this framework it is 
possible to understand why Prichard might envisage ‘moral insanity’ as caused by 
deficits in these ‘higher’ emotional capacities.  The victory of scientific rationalism as the 
19th century progressed has been very clear, however.  An unfortunate side-effect of that 
victory has been the difficulty of apprehending the emotions and their significance at all 
(see Rustin  this volume).  
 
iii. The Psychosocial Perspective: the relationship between selfhood and the social 
body 
 
A third explanation that can be explored here is that debates over moral insanity were 
exposing newly emerging puzzles about the relations not only between right and wrong, 
and between rationality and emotionality, but also the problem of the relationship 
between these individual characteristics and the social body. Notions of personality, how 
individuals related to one another were coming to be seen, and would come to be seen as 
ever more significant to how society functioned (Giddens 1991, Morris 1991).  
 
One plane of this debate was a metaphysical one (Augstein 1996, Glannon 1997). 
Augstein (1996) suggests that Prichard was motivated by his own religious beliefs to 
argue that will and morality could not be simply considered as products of brain 
functions, nor of human reasoning. He was, Augstein suggests, in arguing for ‘moral 
insanity’ defending the notion of the human soul – autonomous from the brain and from 
rational thought. Another plane of debate can be understood as consisting of nascent 
‘social theory’.  Most of what can with hindsight be identified as early social theory that 
emerged from Enlightenment thinking can be summarised as containing a mechanistic 
view of the relationship between individuals and the social world (Morris 1991). 
Beccaria’s (1764) blueprint for the discipline of criminology provides a good example of 
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this view. Beccaria assumed that individuals were rational calculating creatures, who 
weighed up the possible benefits of crime against the likely punishment. The idea of the 
calculating criminal; with the route to controlling crime through gauging crimes and their 
punishments was extremely influential (Hopkins Burke 2005, and Gelsthorpe this 
volume).   
 
Very different schools of thought were, of course, being developed but they were 
strikingly less successful in achieving influence. One notable set of ideas came from 
Bernard Mandeville  (1725, 1732) whose contentious view was that society was driven 
and held together not by rationality at all but by feelings such as pride, shame, envy and 
greed. The hostility to his views about the significance of feelings to the social world, 
that challenged the mechanistic one, is highly illuminating.  Norman Wilde, writing at the 
end of the 19th century describes him as ‘one of the best hated writers of the [18th] 
century’ (Wilde 1898: 219). His work was condemned by Rousseau, ritually burned by 
the public hangman in France, and considered by the Grand Jury of Middlesex for 
offences against public morality (Hundert 1995).  
 
Despite the apparent philosophical dominance of the mechanistic view of personality and 
its relation to society, the social demands for a different kind of individual were, 
however, becoming visible. This demand was emerging in the criminal justice system, as 
recent scholarly work on gender and criminality has noted. Shoemaker (2001), for 
example, argues that shifting expectations of masculine behaviour led to a reduction in 
levels of violence over the 18th century in London. Wiener (2004) also argues that there 
was a re-conceptualisation of masculinity that began in the 18th century which became 
ever more overt in the courts through the 19th century.  Wiener (2004) plots in detail the 
way that courts showed increasing disapproval of both public and private violence. Men 
were seen as ‘more than ever in need of external disciplines and, most of all, of self-
discipline’ (Wiener 2004: 2). Thus the demands for different types of personality, with 
the control of emotions being salient were becoming overt, in line with arguments made 
by Elias (1994/1939) and Stearns (1993) about ‘civilising’ processes. As a consequence 
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of this so the demand for ideas that helped explain and even control ‘personality’ grew 
(Rose 1989).  
 
The exploration of the emergence of ‘moral insanity’, and the challenges it faced can be 
used to inform analysis of the emergence of the related concepts of psychopathy and 
personality disorder which can only be dealt with briefly here. 
 
Psychopathy and Personality Disorder 
 
Although the term ‘psychopathy’ was first used to describe general mental sickness, and 
was associated with ideas of congenital mental defects, the development of the concept of 
‘psychopathy’ being used to describe those who demonstrated emotional or ethical 
failings became closely tied to psychoanalytic thought. The publication of David 
Henderson’s, overtly psychoanalytic work (Henderson 1939), influenced professional 
practice, but it was Cleckley’s (1941)  far more accessibly written book that had the more 
enduring impact in establishing the idea of the rational but ruthlessly amoral personality 
type.  The influence of psychoanalytic thought on psychiatry and wider culture was 
important in two ways for creating space for discourse about this type of personality. 
Firstly, Freudian thought was premised on the idea the mind could be divided into 
different faculties that were capable of autonomous action and influence. Secondly, 
psychoanalytic thought privileged emotion, most particularly the significance of 
sexuality, as being fundamental to identity and relationships. The emergence of the 
category of psychopathy alongside anxiety and interest in the significance of sexuality 
was quite clear in the USA as many states adopted ‘Sexual Psychopath Laws’ 
(Guttmacher and Weihofen 1952). Freedman (1987) argues that these laws were 
symptomatic of a society both perplexed and fascinated by the possibilities of sexual 
‘liberation’. Meanwhile in England and Wales the term psychopath appeared as a 
category in the 1959 MHA. Although there was no formal link to sexual behaviour, 
aberrant sexual behaviour loomed large in use of the concept. For example, ‘psychopathic 
personality’ was successfully used in court for the first time as part of a defence of 
‘diminished responsibility’ in the trial of R. vs Matheson who had ‘a long history of 
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extreme sexual abnormality’ and was accused of the murder of a young boy who he had 
been sexually abusing (Hall Williams 1960; Walker and McCabe 1973: 216).   Thus the 
notion of ‘psychopathy’ received sufficient support from psychoanalytically influenced 
psychiatry to enter legislation both in Britain and the US. It remained relatively marginal 
within mainstream psychiatry (most notably in Britain where psychoanalytic ideas did 
not have as wide as acceptance as in US psychiatry). 
 
Whilst the term ‘psychopathy’ still survived in the Mental Health Act of England and 
Wales until 2007, its use in the clinical world had become far less fashionable by the 
1970s. The Butler Committee  (DSS 1975) recommended that the term be replaced with 
that of ‘personality disorder’. Although this did not happen, and the category of 
‘psychopathy’ remained in the 1983 Act, there are now a plethora of Personality Disorder 
diagnoses recognised by DSM (the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, published by the 
American Psychiatric Association and ICD (Inernational Calssificiation of Disease, 
pubslished by WHO). At the heart of the diagnosis is the existence of disturbance of 
affect and personal relationships. In the UK, government interest in the diagnosis has led 
to considerable research effort that has attempted to trace the best treatments and most 
likely causes (Moran and Hagell 2001, for example). Whilst it would be impossible to 
summarise this work, nevertheless one or two issues are worth highlighting. Whilst 
definitions are still contentious it is becoming clear that the difficulties that people 
experience (that are consistent with these diagnoses) have usually to be understood in 
terms of their life histories (Jones 2008). Clinical studies that have looked specifically at 
personality disorders emphasise the association with negative life events (Pagano et al. 
2004) and deprived childhoods in particular (Bandelow et al. 2005). Hodges (2003) goes 
as far as to argue that ‘borderline personality disorder’ might be understood in terms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder, since those individuals are so likely to have experienced 
trauma. Looking more widely there is a significant body of criminological literature that 
has taken a longitudinal approach to understanding the development of criminal and 
antisocial behaviour. This work points clearly to the roots of behaviour and 
characteristics that are consistent with personality disorder diagnoses often lying deep 
within experiences of emotional and social deprivation in childhood, with disrupted 
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family relationships being prominent (Jones 2008). Recent psychoanalytically informed 
work on the development of such problems also points the significance of early 
relationships.  Fonagy et al (2003) have argued that the ability to make sense of emotion 
is a developmental achievement, occurring in the early years of life. Without this capacity 
individuals are left only with the ability to experience and react to emotion rather than 
reflect and think about emotion. The unpredictable behaviour, the erratic emotional 
responses, the difficulties in forming and maintaining relationships are not only the 
obvious consequences of such disabilities, but they are also the cornerstone of the 
diagnosis of personality disorder. The developmental achievement that Fonagy et al. 
emphasise is the ability to ‘mentalise’; that is to create a model of the self in the mind. 
This they argue is an ability that can only be built through close empathic relationships 
with others. In this formulation the difficulties of personality disorder emerge as truly 
psychosocial disorders that not only manifest within distorted and dysfunctional 
relationships with others, but have their beginnings in the emotional timbre of early 
relationships. It is entirely conceivable that such ‘disorders’ are becoming more visible  
as society demands ever more reflexivity and management of the self as many 
commentators have suggested (Giddens 1991, Rose 1989, Wouters 1999). Such an 
understanding challenges the more traditional focus of psychiatry that has sought to 
understand the pathologies of an individual that exist autonomously within that 
individual.  The so-called personality disorders are truly psychosocial disorders that can 
only be perceived in the interaction between an individual psyche and their particular 
social relationships, they often seem to have their roots in adverse emotional experiences 
within childhood. The early life of Michael Stone is certainly consistent with this pattern, 
being characterised by high levels of disruption. His father and mother had a stormy 
relationship with a number of splits and reconciliations. His mother remarried another 
man, and then quickly divorced. He was placed in temporary care at age 7; the case notes 
from the time contained ‘repeated descriptions of Michael being exposed to violence 
within the home’ (ibid: 47) including witnessing his father attack another man with an 
axe. Stone’s his first appearance in court was at age 12, after which he was put into care.  
Substantial parts of his teen years were spent in various institutions for youth offenders. 
His first sentence to an adult prison was at age 17; at age 19 he was convicted for robbery 
 15
and grievous bodily harm. Even if Stone had not met the Russel family in that country 
lane in Kent, all the signs were that Stone’s life was going to reach another calamitous 
conclusion. The problem remains about how to understand and intervene in such chaotic 
lives.  As Scanlon and Adlam (2008) argue the difficulties ‘we’ have in engaging with the 
‘difficult people’ who have been often been physically and psychically rejected and who 
now refuse ‘our’ attempts to help and engage with them are immense.     
 
Conclusion 
 
The category of personality disorder remains a terribly problematic one. It is still not 
entirely accepted that the personality disorders are really psychiatric disorders.  Yet it is a 
category that has persisted for over 200 hundred years. Taken on their own each of the 
diagnostic categories of moral insanity, psychopathy and personality disorder might well 
fit with Hacking’s descriptions of ‘transient’ mental states. An historical perspective 
helps us to see that these categories are more enduring, that they are arising from real 
needs to understand and get to grips with particularly problematic phenomena – that of 
individuals who have good cognitive awareness of the world around them but who are 
poorly equipped to operate at an affective level in human society. It has been argued here 
that they are problematic for a culture that has privileged rationality and has assumed that 
emotions belong to a separate and less significant domain. Psychoanalysis has been a 
language that has allowed for exploration of the experiences of people whose behaviour 
falls into these categories. Psychoanalysis though, needs the psychosocial dimension so 
that the relationship between the inner worlds of individuals and how those worlds 
interact with the social body and clash and fail our expectations of selfhood can more 
properly be grasped.   
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